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UNIT 7, , JOHN LOCKE, , Structure, 7.1, , 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, , 7.5, 7.6, 77, 7.8, 7.9, , 7.1, , Introduction, Life and Works, Some Philosophical Problems, The State of Nature and Natural Rights, Social Contract and Civil Society, Consent, Resistance and Toleratio11, The Lockeai~Legacy, Summary, Exercises, , INTRODUCTION, , ,, , A profound and extensive study of John Locke has been one of the nlost remarkable achievements, of recent philosophical scholarship. Perhaps no otlier political thinker, excep4 his great senior, contemporary, Thomas Hobbes, has received greater attention at the hand: of historians of, thought within the last fifty years or so than the author of the Two Peatises of Government and, Ai7 Essay Concerning Hztnian Understanding, The discovery of a wealth of new material in, Lovelace collection and a large ni~rnberof critical conzmelltaries based on it, have vastly added, to our knowledge about Locke's life and thought. And yet, curiously enough, there is today a, greater divergence of opinion about the real spirit or the "hidden meaning" of Locke's political, theory than ever before. A beginner is almost sure to be lost in a maze of motley interpretationsfrom Straussian esotericism claiming for Locke a thoroughgoing Hobbism, a consistently egoistic, and utilitarian ethics, to a deol~tologicalview of Locke's ethic put forth by Raymond Polin,, representing hitn as a classical natural law thinker; from Vaughan's characterisation of Locke, as a "prince of individualists" to Kendal17sinterpretati~~, of llim as a collectivist of Rousseau's, brand; from "liberal constitutionalisrn" of Locke in Martin Seliger's analysis to Macpherson's, exposition of it as a theory of "capitalist appropriation" and "the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie"., Perhaps t'lere is some truth in each of tliese interpretations, but when Locke's philosophy is, subjected to a Procrustean technique of inter~.station and is made to conforrn to a particular, pltilosophical label, it suffers heavy disto tion and lones, not only its richness and catholicity,, but also its identity. The paradoxical b;ttlat:,~iwhich thus emerges is best illustrated by coinparing, proto-Kantian moralist and a philosopher of, Taylor-Warrender's Hobb~s,as a deo~~tological, theory with Locke as interpreted by Leo Strauss and Richard, Natural Law and Divine eo~n~naill, Cox, as a perfect psycl~ologicale g ~ i sand, t et11;:al relativist, or covert Hobbist. This has been, ironically described by J.W.W. Watkins in these wards, "This situation is painful for examination, candidates, liable to be asked to 'compare and contrast' Hobbes and Locke. So let us all agree, to the followi~lgcompromise: Hobbes was a moralising natural lawyer in Hooker tradition,, wllile Locke preached a mixture of egoism, fear and authority, and Locke wrote The Second, Treatise, while Hobbes wrote Leviathan., , ,, I, , 7.2, , LIFE AND WORKS, , Locke's life (1632-1704) coincided with one of the most significant epochs of British history, that saw the transfornlation of absolute monarchy into parliamelltary democracy. It was a period

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i, , iI, , of the Glorious Resolutio~iof 1689 witli which Locke was closely associated along with Lord, Ashley, tlie first Earl of Sliaftesbury, Loclte's friend and patron, who was charged with conspiracy, to exclude Cliarles I1 froni acceding to the throne. Locke, suspecting pe~*secution,went into, voluntary exile in Holland and remained there till the final overthrow of the Stuart despotisn~, in 1689. He welco~ned William of Orange, as the 'Great Restorer' and lawful ruler. Locke, published his Two Treatises of Governntent in 1690. Tlie same year saw the publication of his, famous philosophical work The Essay Concerning fIzmzan Understanding. Locke's other, important writings were the Lellers Col7ceruing Tole~arion(1689, 1690 and 1692) and Some, Thoughts Conceruing Edzlcation (1693). Locke's early essays on the Law's Nature were, published wit11 an English translation by W. von Leyden in 1959 (Oxford University Press)., , ,, , The Two Treatises of Government consists of two parts-the.first is the refutation of Fil~izerand, the second, tlne more important of the two, is an inquiry into tlle "True original, Extent and End, of Civil Government." Tlie work was ostetisibly written to justify the Glorious Revolution, "to, establisli the tlirone of o ~ l rGreat Restorer, Our present King William, to make good his Title,, in the Consent of the People, wliicli being the only one of all lawful Governments, he lias more, fully and clearly than any Prince in C1ir.istendoni: And to justifie to the World, the People of, England, wliose lovc of tlieir Just and Natural Riglits, with their Resolution to preserve them,, saved the Nation wlie~iit was on the very brink of Slavery and Ruirre." This historical linkage ., has been challenged by modern scholars. Peter Laslett lias argued tliat the Second Treatise has, written at least as early as 168 I and tliat it was written first, and Locke later added tlie First, to it. The First: Treatise is not generally considered to be of great philosopliical importance. Tlie, ideas of Filmer vis-a-vis Locke have been another subject of col1troversy. All scholars do not., of the Two Treatis. Richard, agree with Laslett regarding tlie date and tlie order of co~~~position, Ashcraft and John Dunn have discussed these cluestions in detail. We may set aside this, liistorical controversy for our present purpose and pass on to more theoretical issues., , 7.3, , SOME PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS, , The first ancl forelnost controversy about the pliilosophical foundation of Locke's political, theory relates to the alleged conflict, or flat contradiction between his empiricist theory of, knowledge as expot~ndedin his Essay Concerning Human Understanding and the rationalist, view of Natural Law adumbrated in tlie Second Treatise of Civil Government as the cornerstolie of his political theory., , Critics like C.E. Vaughan, George H. Sabine and Peter Laslett have argued tliat the notion of, natural law cannot be reconciled with the overall e~npiricis~n, of Locke which shows itself in, lzis criticism of intiate ideas and his theory of origin of knowledge in sense-experience and, reflection. But a carefill analysis of Locke's epistenlology leads to the col~clusiolltliat the, blanket label 'e~npiricist'is tiot properly applicable to Locke and his theory contains important, rationalist elements. EIe expressly says that his criticism of innate ideas should not be understood, to irnply the rt$ectioti of natural law. Moreover, only sense expcrie~icecannot provide us witli, certain knowledge, that is knowledge,' in the true sense, without the creative participation of, mind. His tlieory of knowledge, at least ill its broad perspective and aim, closely resembles, the, critical philosopliy of ]Cant, and it lias to be dearly distinguished from the atomistic sensatiotlalism, of the British empiricists who followed him., Allotlier ele~nentof Locke's theory wlzicl; is supposed t o impair the coherence and integrity of, his notion of Natural law and i t s intuitionist overtone is his psychological hedonism. To be sure,, a hedonistic motivation to niorality cannot be denied in Locke. But it nus st be remembered that

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though he defines good and evil in terms of pleasure and pain, these are to him only consequences, of a morally right action; they do not constitute its essence. A moral law is eternal and universal, and it is obligatory independently of its pleasurable consequences. "Utility", says Locke, "is not, the basis of the law or the ground of obligation, but the consequence of obedience to it.", Locke's moral theory, therefore, is essentially deontological rather than utilitarian and, consequentialist. In legal theory similarly he is more of an intellectualist than a voluntarist., There is, therefore, no conflict between natural law postulated in the Second Treatise and the, ethical and epistemological theory of the Essay. Locke is a consistent Natural Law theorist., , 7.4 THE STATE OF NATURE AND NATURAL RlGMTS, , I, , I, , 11, ;, , i, , I, , .I, , I, , 1, , We thus see that Natural Law constitutes an integral part of Locke's moral and political theory., It is central to his co~~ception, of the state of nature as well as of civil society. The state of, nature, as we know, is the stock-in-trade of all contract theories of the state. It is conceived as, a state prior to the establishment of political society. In Locke's version it is pre-political,, though not pre-social, for men are essentially social by nature. The state of nature, far from, and self-preservation." It has, being a war of all is a state of "peace, goodwill, mutual assista~~ce, law of nature to govern it. This Law "obliges everyone: and reason, which is that law, teaches, ail manki~id,who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm, one another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions, for Inen being all the workmanship of, one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into, tlze world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, wl~oseworkmanship they, are, made to last during his, not one anotller's pleasure : and being furnished with like faculties,, sharing all in one cornrnunity of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordit~ation, among us, that may authorise us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's, uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours." In the state of nature men have natural right, to life, liberty and property. These rights are inalienable and inviolable for they are derived, from the Law of Nature which is God's reason. Every one is bound by reason not only to, preserve oneself but to preserve all mankind, insofar as his ow11 preservation does not come in, conflict with it. Again, men are free and equal and there is no cominonly acknowledged, superior whose orders they are obliged to obey. Every body is the judge of his own actions., But thougl~the natural condition is a state of liberty, it is not a state of licence. Nobody has, a right to destroy liiinself and destroy the life of any otl~ermen, "but where some nobler use, than its bare preservation calls for it." Because there is no common judge to punish the, violation of natural law in the state of nature, every individual is Iiis own judge and has the, executive power of punishing the violators of the law of nature. This violation may be against, him or against mankind in general. But when inen are judges in their own case, they cannot, be impartial. There are also other inconveniences in the state of nature-there is no established,, settled, ki~ownlaw, to be the standard of right and wrong; there is no impartial judge to decide, cases of dispute; and finally, "in tlle state of nature there often wants power to back and support, the se~ltencewhen right, and to give it due executio~~.", In other words, there are three lacunas, ,, or cinconveniences' in the state of nature-want of a legislature authority to declare law, of an, impartial judge lo decide cases of violation of law and lacli/of an impersonal executioner of the, law. Thus we find that the state of nature, while it is not a state of war, is also not an idyllic, condition and, therefore, it has to be superseded sooner or later. Conflicts and uncertainties are, bound to arise on accowlt of the selfish tendencies in human nature. The state of nature is, always in danger of 6eing transformed into a state of war. Where every one is the judge in his i, own case and has the sole authority to punish, peace is bound to be threatened., I, 1, , Tliough Locke so~netilnesdraws upon historical evidence to support his concept of the state of, nature, the idea is essentially a ratio~ial construct, a hypothesis to explain the nature and

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foundation of political society. A more controversial point that emerges from Locke's account, of the state of nature is its dual character. Writers like Leo Strauss and Richard Cox have, argued that basically Locke's theory is a restatement of the Hobbist view of hulnan nature, disguised and couclied in a inore palatable language (Leo Strauss, 1960). These writers believe, that the state of nature in Locke which is described as a state of "peace, good will, mutual, assistance and preservation" turns out on analysis to be a state of war on account of the, operation of passions, a situation for wl~ichthe only retlledy is the creation of civil society., They charge Locke not only of inconsistency, but also of hypocrisy and of having "hidden, meaning". Professor Macpherson has found two conilicting notions of Locke's state of nature,, one before and the other after the invention of nioney, accusil~gLocke of bourgeois mentality., These interpretations, however, are higl~lyselective and too restriclive. They ignore the real, spirit of Locke and go against his clearly expressed opinions. They have rightly beet1 rejected, by Aarsleff, Ashcraft and Seliger, scholars who have written on Locke witllout any ideological, bias or philosopliical presupposition and self-professed esoteric methodology., Another important concept in Locke's political pllilosophy is that of natural right to life, liberty, and property. These natural rights are derived fi-om natural law and are linlited by it. "The, freedom of man and liberty of acting according to llis will is grounded on l ~ i shaving reason,, which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern liimself by, and make him know how, far he is left to the freedom of his own will". "The end of law is not to abolish or to restrain,, but to preserve or enlarge freedom, for in all the states of created beings, where there is no law,, there is no freed on^.", Right to property is intinlately connected with right to life and liberty as its necessary, consequence. Sometimes Locke sut~lsup all natural rights in the right to property. But property, is not his exclusive concern. Life and liberty are more important. Man creates property by, mixing his labour with the objccts of nature. In the beginning, all things were held in common,, But common ownership is not sufficient to provide men with m a n s of life R I I ~satisfy their, S ~ his labour with the resources provided by nature to enable him to make, needs. Man I I ~ L I mix, use of them in a more efficacious and profitable way. Since man owns his own person, his body, and limbs, the object with which he mixes his l a b o ~ ~, becotnes, r, his own property by right. This, is the origin of the famous labour theory of value common to botln the classical and the Marxian, economics. Locke does not believe that man has an unlimited right of appropriatioii. There are, three important li~nitations011 ownership of property. Tlte first, called "labour-ljn~itation", is, that one can appropriate only that much of common resources with which he has mixed his, labour. The second limitation, the "sufficiency limitation" enjoins man to appropriate only as, much as is required by him and leave "enough and as good for others." The third limitation;, know11as a 'spoilage limitation', requires that 1na11should acquire a thing only if he can make, good use of it, since nothing was ~nacleby God for lnan to spoil or destroy. If one takes more,, he "invades his neighbour's share" wllich is prollibited by the law of nature., Many critics have foiund these limitations rnostly verbal which are rendered quite otiose in the, later stage of the state of nature, especially afier the invention of money. About the supposed, 'labour limitation', Macpherson's critique is that it was in fact never seriously entirtained by, Locke but has been read into his theory by those who have approached it in the modern, tradition of humanist liberalism. The introduction of wage labour, that is the right to purchase, the labour of others on pay~nentof wages, makes it possible and rightful for a man to appropriate, th? product of other men's labour. Then Locke also gives a man the right to bequeath his, property. This is, according to Macplzerson, "an indication of his (Locke's) departure from the, medieval view and acceptance of the bourgeois view expressed so tersely by Hobbes.", Introduction of money which allows men to exchange goods for money, removes the limitatition, C, , '

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imposed by the non-spoilage principle. Macpherson concludes that Locke not only justifies the, right to unequal property but approves of unlimited individual appropriation. Locke is thus, presented as an ideologue of "possessive individualism", of market econolny and the "dictatorship, of the bourgeoisie." He is seen as a typical representative of the "spirit of capitalism.", Plamenatz's criticisin is based more on logical than ideological grounds. He points out three, rnajor defects in Locke's theory of property:, , "In the first place, the limits he sets on appropriation, the injunction to let nothing spoil or go, to waste, is either irrelevant or inadequate, for it makes sense only under conditions which are, in fact rare; secondly, the right to bequest, wliicll Locke tactly includes in the right of property,, does not derive either from the right to preserve life and liberty, or from the right to set aside, for your own, exclusive use what you have mixed your labour with; and thirdly, it does not, foIlow, even if your mixing your labour with something gives you a right to use it to the, , exclusioll of people who have not nlixed their labour with it, that your being the first to mix, labour with something gives you tlie right not to share it with anyone who subsequently mixes, his labour wit11 itV(George Plamenatz, 1963, p.242)., The ideological i~~terpretatioti, of Locke in terms of capitalist economy and the dictatorsliip of, tlle bourgeoisie have been challenged by Isaiah Berlin, Alan Ryan, Martin Seliger, Richard, Ashcraft, I-Ians Aarsleff, John Dunn and others. They argue that ~ a c ~ h e r s o i iview, ' s overlooks, the overriding role of Natural Law and the idea of common good that it itnplies. Locke is too, much of a medievalist and believer in God to ignore the dictates of Divine Reason and to, espouse unabashedly tlie cause of the rising capitalist class wlzose ethos is cut-tliroat co~npetition, for wealth accun~ulationresulting in class conflict and misery for the have-nots. George H., Sabine is perhaps mcre to the point when he says: "He left standing tlie old theory of natural, law with all its emotional connoiation and alnlost religious compulsions, but he completely, changed, without knowing it, tl~emeaning which the term had in writers like Hooker. Instead, of law enjoining the comtiio~~, good of society, Locke set up a body of innate, indefeasible,, individual rigl~tswhich limit tlie competence of the community, and stand as bars to prevent, interference with the liberty and property of private persons" (G.H. Sabine, 1963, p.529)., "Macpherson paid as little attention as Slrauss did to the fact tliat no one aillong Locke's, contemporaries read or understood his argument from their postulated standpoints, or to tlie fact, that Locke personally subscribed to and identified his own position with those religious beliefs, he was pres~llnablyadvancing as a sop to lesser minds, or thaf he was writing in defence of, revolutionasy political action and religious dissent-positions adhered to by a very small minority, o f his conte~nporaries-which did not appeal to the established property-owners whose interest, he was supposed to be looking after (Ashcraft). Equally damaging to Macplierson's case was, his failure to provide the liistorical and sociological evidence necessary to establisli his claims, regarding tlie kind of society 17th Century England was, since the more inappropriate the, 'tnodel' or society fortnulated by Macpl~ersonis as a descriptive characterisation of Locke's, envirotlment, the more difficult it becomes to associate that model with Locke's intentional, purposes in writing the Two Treatises" (Richard Ashcraft, 1987, pp.301-302). 111 a siinilar vein, Martin Seliger argues that li~nitationson private property ~nentionedby Locke are never rendered, illusory either by the invention of money or by the admission of landed property in the interest, of more efficient production. "We'cannot ascribe to Locke the view that due to a contrivance, for the more effective exercise o f rights of property, positive law could not contain property, accu~nulationin accordance wit11 natural law. The right of property is the prototype of all, natural rights. They are freedoms sanctioned by natural law, and freedom is protected and, bounded by positive law in all spheres of action"(Marti11 Seliger, 1968, pp.166-1 67).

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Professor Jolin Dunn in his remarkable work Tlw Political Thozlght of John Locke has offered, an interpretation of Locke wliich is diametrically opposed to Macplierson's account. According, to Dunn: "tlie Lockea~isocial and political theory is to be seen as the elaboration of Calvinist, social values, in tlie absence of a terreslrial focus of tlieological authority and in response to, a series of popular cl~alIenges"(JolinDunn, p.259). "Locke saw the rationality of llu~na~i, existence,, a rationality which he spent so tiiucll of liis life i l l altcmpting to vindicate, as dependent upon, the truths of religion"(Jo11n Dunn, p.263). Elaborating fiu-ther, Dunn (1980, '1983a) observes:, "In contrast witli tlie alienated modern conception of tlie context of political agency and the, instrumental view of its character which dominate modern political thinking,, Locke cotilbi~lesa radically individualist conception of both tlie lluman significance and the, rationality of political agency with a wholly unnlienated conception of its social context. Because, this conception of political agency depends for its structure and stability on a persotial relation, n, and the deity, it can scarcely be adopted as a basis for, between the indiviclual l i ~ ~ m aagent, gounding modern political identities"., In a carefitlly argued and exhaustive sttldy, A. Jolin Simmons comes to the cot~clusio~i, that, Locke "cer~ainlycondemns covetousness (contrary to the claiti~sof Strauss, Nuturd Rights,, 247), and there is no inclicatio~~, that he intends to defend a taig1itof uvrliirzited accu~iiulation.But, neither does lie take the use of money and its creation of subslazitial inequality to be contrary, to God's will, or to end all legitilllate appropriation i~tidertlie rules of natural propel-ty" (A., Jollli Sim~nons,1994, p.305). Locke, says Simtnons, occi~pies"the middle groui~d,calling, neither for i~nfetteredaccumulation of property nor for radical redistribution of lloldings"., , Locke's t1ieol.y of property seems to oscillate between large acculnulation consistent with, sufficient amount of regulation and detemiination of land ownership by political authority in, tlie interest of equitable distribution. 'rliougli one cannot attribute to lii~na doctrine of differential, rationality socially and politically Fdvoring the propertied classes, it call hardly be denied that, tlie whole tenor of his argument goes in favour of those w l ~ oown large property as compareci, wit11 ordinary citizens. A neat summaly of Locke's theory can be given as follows in tlie words, of Peter Laslett:, "Even tlie minutest control of property by political authority car1 be reconciled with tlie doctrine, of Two Treatises, a~idas Professor Vilier has pointed out, Locke no where cornplai~isagainst, the co~nplicatedregulations of his 'mercantilist' age in ternis of propeity rights. If not colnplete, com~~iunism,, certainly redistributive taxation, perhaps natiotialisation could be justified on the, principles we have discussed: all that would be necessary is tlie consellt of the majority of tlie, society, regularly and constitutionally expressed, and such a law would hold even if all the, property owners were in the minority." Laslett fi~rtliersays that "it: is gratuitous to tunl Loclie's, doctrine of property into the classic doctrille of the 'spirit of capitalism', whatever that may be", (Peter Laslett, p. 104- 1 05)., "In fact, of course, Locke was neither a 'socialist' nor a 'capitalist' though it is fascinating to, fitid elements of botli attitudes of ours in liis property doctrine, more, perhaps, in wliat he left, out or just failed to say than in tlie statetneilt tl~eriiselves.He was ~ i o eveti, t, an advocate of land, and land ownership as tlle basis of political power to be 'represented' in a nation's counsels., For all liis enormoirs intellectual mid political influeoce in the 18th Century he was it1 this, respect a barren field for anyone who wisllecl to justify what once was called Whig obligatory., But lie did ilsc his property doctri~leto give.continuily to a political society, to join generation, to get~erntion"(Pctcr Laslett, p.105).

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"7.5, , SOCIAL CONTRACT AND CIVIL SOCIETY, , What drives men into society, according to Locke, is tliat God put them "under strong Obligations, of Necessity, Convenience, and Inclination." Political power is a "Right of making Laws with, Penalties of Death, and conseque~ltlyall less Penalties, for the Regulating and Preserving of, Propelty, and of employing tlie force of the Community, in the Execution of such Laws, and, in tlie defence of the Common-wealth from Foreign Iiijury, and all this only for the Public, Good". And "men being, as has been said, by Nature, all free, equal and independent, no one, can be put otit of this Estate (i.e. state of nature), and subjected to political power of another, without his own consent." Therefore, tlie problem is to form civil society by common consent, of all men'and transfer their rigiit of punisliing the violators of Natural Law to an independent, and i~upartiala~~tliority., For all practical purposes, after the formation of civil society this, con~ii~on, consent becomestlie coilsent of tlie majority; all parties must submit to tlie deter~nination, of t11e majority which carries tlie force of the community, for that is tlie only way of political, action. So all men ~~naninzo~~sly, agree to incorporate themselves in one body and conduct their, affairs by the opinion of the majority. After they have set up a political or civil society, tlie next, step 'is to appoint a government or 'legislative' to declare and execute tlie natural law. This, Locke calls tlie 'supreme' authority established by the commonwealth or civil society. Here we, have two separate acts-one by which the civil society is established and tlie otlier which, creates the government. While tlie first is the product of a contract, the second is "only a, : fiduciary power to act for certain ends", and,there remains "still in tlie people a supreme power, to remove or alter tlie legislative, when they find tlie legislative act contrary to the trust reposed, i11/them." The relationship between society and the government is expressed by tlie idea of trust, hkcause it obviates niaking the government a party to the contract and giving. it an independent, Status and authority. Professor Ernest Barker and J.W. Gougl~have placed great emphasis 011, the technical implications of tlie trust theory, which rnakes the community both tlie trusted and, tlie beneficiary, having no duties as regards the trustee, tliat is the government. Laslett (p.115),, oil tlie other Iiand, interprets it in a no11-legal sense "intended to make it clear tliat all actions, of governors are limited to tlie end of government, which is the good of tlie governed, and to, demonstrate by contrast that there is no contract in it, that is all7'., Besides the 'legislative' which is the supreme authority, Locke mentions two other powers of, tlie co~nnionwealth,the executive and the federative. The federative power of the gover~iment, is concer~iedwith what we now call foreign affairs. What Montesquieu later on called the, judicial power is included in tlie executive. The executive power is subordinate to the legislative, and is responsible to it., , A, , ,, , ,, , I, , II, I, , Though the legislative is the supreme power, it is not arbitrary. It exists for coinmoll good, which is the preservatio~iof freedom and protection of property. "The Law of Nature stands as, an Eternal Rule to all Men, Legislators as well as others. The Rules that they make for otlier, Men's Action, must . . . be conformnble to tlie Law of Nature, that is to tlie will of God, of, which Ihat is a Declaration, atid the 'fundamental law of Nature being the preservation of, Mankind, 110 Huillan Sanction can be good, or valid against it." Secondly, the Legislative or the, Supreme Authority cannot sule by extemporary, arbitra~ydecrees, but o111y by duly promulgated, and established laws. Thirdly, the supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his, property without his consent. And lastly, "the legislative cannot transfer the power of making, laws to any otlier llands, for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it, cannot pass it over to others" (Second Treatise, see. 141)., The above restriction o s the 'supremeb authority of tlie legislative body has tended to obscure, Loclte's view of sovereignty. C.E. Vaughan has categorically declared that "Locke had no

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tlieory of sovercignty at all, the true sovereign of Civil Govern171el~tis tlie i~ldividi~al", (Vauglian,, p.185). And accordilig to Ernest Barker: "Loclce had no clear view of tlie nature and residence, of sovereignty" (Barker, 1958, Introduction). This is u~ifairto Locke. It is to identify the notion, of sovereignty with only one of its variants, tlie Hobbesean-Austinian version wliicli conceives, sovereignty in terlns or 1113 will of an absolute power. 'The other view wliicli regards sovereignty, not as power, but authority and an expression of a transcendent reason, natura! law or Divine, Order, adniits tlie lin~itationsof a Higher Law on the power of tlie state without denying its, competence and authority in relation to positive law. Tliis is thc tradition on which Locke was, fed and it is the bed-rock of all constitutional goven.itiient. It harks back to St. Thomas Aquinas, through Hooker and Bodin and is represented by writers like Eliot, Phillip Hilnton and Sir, Matliew Hale in Locke's own time. Loclte admits that behilid the authority of the legislature, there is an ultimate sovereignty of people wliicli later writers termed as popular sovereignty., "...And thus the conimunity perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from tlia, attempt and designs of anybody, even of their legislators, whenever they shall be so foolish or, so wicked as to lay or carry on designs against tlie liberties and properties of the subject", (Second Treatise, sec. 149). But the community exercises tliis power "not as considered it~icler, any fomi of government, because tliis power of the people call never take place till the government, be dissolved" (sec. 49), and "in all cases, while tlie government subsists, the legislative is the, suprenle power" (sec. 150). The doctrine of popular or natiolial sovereignty cannot be propcrly, ascribed to Loclce. Tlie ulti~iiatesource of all authority in his theory is the Law of Nature. But, sovereigrity in tlie technical selise resides only in tlic law-making body. 'Tliis legislative is not, only the supreme power of tlie com~iionwealtl~,, but sacred arid ~rnaltcrablein tlie hand where, tlie commu~iityhave once placed it; nor can tlie edict or any one else, in whatsoever forrii, conceived, or by what power soever backed, liave the force allti obligatio~iof a law wliicl~has, 1101its sanction li.0111 tlie legislative wliicli the public has chosen and appointed; ....and tlierefore, all the obedience, wliicli by tlie most solemn lies any otic can be obliged to pay, ultimately, ter~iiinesin tlie supreme power ..." (Second 7i.eatiseLs,see 134)., In a penetrating criticism of Locke, George I-I. Sabine points out four levels of authority i n Ttvo, Treatises, the last three bcing represented as successively derivative frorii tlie first. But Loclte, seems to attribute "a kind of absoluteness to each of tlie four." First, there is tlie individual and, his rigllts, the foundation 0.f the whole system. Seconclly, there is the community; the custodian, of individual right and the authority standing behind tlie government, Tliirdly, there is !:he, goveriiment or tlie 'legislative' wliicli is constitutio~iallytlie 'supreme power', And finally, we, have the executive, or the King, wliicli also elljoys solne liind of independent status and, discretionaty power while I-etiiainingsubservient to the 'legislative', or parliament. Tliis, however,, Wr fro~nbeing a criticism, may be take11as a commendation. Locke was f~rllyconscious of tlie, colnplexity of political systeni and lie was attempting to present a phenomenology of political', institotions without adopting a reductionist methodology wliicli seeks to explain all things in, terms of a single ~~ltiniate, entity, irreducible social ato~lisor abstract entity like the community, or people. Ile was neitlier a pure nominalist nor a perfect realist. Being a conceptualist, he is, nearer to Aristotle than either to Plato or to tlie Protagoras or tlie Sophists. I-Iis state is not a, 'fictitious corporation' like that of 1-lobbes,but it is also 110tHegel's 'concrete universal'. Locke, wants to ti~aintnin balance and Iiar~nonyamong different organs of government under the, supreme majesty of Natural Law., , 7.6 CONSENT RESISTANCE AND TOLERATION, Goverii~ncntbased on consent: is tlie fi~ndamentalprincipIe of Loclte's theory of political, obligation. The idea of consent, however, is not properly explained ancl it remains one of tlie, , 103

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most vulnerable features of Locke's theory. John Plamenatz subjects it to a searching critique, and comes to the conclusion that it serves no usefill purpose. The notion ,of Tacit Consent, introduced to make the concept applicable to cases wliere express consent is wanting makes it, all the more questionable and dispensable. As Plamenatz pithily puts it: "If you begin by, assuming that only a consellt creates a duty of obedience, you are only too ready to conclude, that whatever creates that duty must be consentm(JohnPlamenatz, p.22). "We consent to obey, by obeying. Obedience creates the obligation to obey. But this is absurd." (p.230). John Dunn, also finds fault with the notions of consent as the basis of freedom in the state., "The Two Treatises is an attempt to argue for limitations on the possible scope of political, obligation. The notion of consent is a key term in the expository structure of this argument, but, it is not a tern1 which exerts any very precise coiitrol over the application of the argllnient to, particular cases in the world. Its role is as a formal colnponent of the logical structure of the, argument, not as a practical criterion of its applicabitity in particular cases. Consent is a, necessary condition for tlie legitimacy of a political society, but the consent which creates such, legitimacy is not a sufficient condition for the obligatory force of any particular act of authority, in such a society"(Jo11n Dunn, p. 143)., It is generally believed that Locke is above all an apologist of the Glorioi~sRevolution, perhaps, the most conservalive of all revolutions. As such, resistance or a right to rebellion-Locke, seldoln uses tlie word 'revo1utio11'-is an essential part of his political philosopliy. A ruler who, usurps power or forfeits the trust of the people and acts accol-dingto his own arbitrary will in, contravention of the law of nature atld against tlie good of the people has no legitimate authority, to govern and can be removed, if necessary, by force. Goverlirnent is dissolved also in case of, conquest by a foreign power, in tlie event of assembly being prevented from meeting and, deliberating by the prince or on a dislocation of legislative authority. The dissolution of, govertiment, however, does not involve dissolutioti of society. As to who has a right of rebellion, or resistance, Locke does not give a clear answer. Generally, it is only the lna-jority wl~ichhas, , a right to revolt. Though Loclte was the cllampion of revolutionary action, he was essentially, a consesvative by tet~lperament.He was of the view that revolutioli was to be resorted to only, in extreme cases. According to Sabine, in spite of his insistence on right to revol~~tions,, Locke, was not a revolutio~iary.Many critics have held the view that Locke gives the right of revolution, only to the aristocratic class, that is, tlie owners of property. "It seemed natural to Ilim, as it, seemed nearly to all his contemporaries, that the right to resist rulers who have abused their, authority should in practice be confined to the educated and propertied classes, to the section, ofthe corumunity alone capable of an intelligent and responsible judgement in such a matter"(John, Platnenatz, p.250)., Aslicraft does not agree with this view and finds in Loclce a Inore radical revolutionary spirit., 111 this connection he notes tlie difference between Locke and the Whig oligarchy which was, behind the Revolution of 1688. "Resistance to tyranny is everyone's business", says Ascliraft, summing up Locke's views on tlie subject (Ashcraf?, p.228), Religious toleration was a topic of great importance in Locke's time, and in consonance with, his g e ~ ~ e rphilosophy, al, and political theory he placed great emphasis on it. Conscience, he held,, cannot be a subject of external control. A man is free to profess any religion he likes. Tlie state, should not in any case reso~tto religious persecution. It should not enforce practices relating, to faith. However, Locke imposes certain limitations on religious tolerance. "No opi!?:on, contrary, to human society, or to those moral rules which are necessary for the prescrviztion of civil, society are to be tolerated by tlie magistrate." Again, atheists sl~ouldriot be toltarated because, ' c p r ~ ~ ~ covenants,, ~ i ~ e s , and oaths, which are tlie bonds of human society, can have no hold upon, an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thouglit, dissolves all.", 104, , '', , I, , I, , I, , 1, 1, I, , ,, , 1, , I, , I

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THE LOCKEAN 'LEGACY, John Locke is one of the central figures in nod ern European politicaI thought. The most characteristic, term for this thought is liberalism, tl~ouglithis term has both conservative and radical implications., The concept liberalism has undergone several changes during the coarse of time. There is a classical, form of liberalism and also one which we call neo-liberalism. Locke's liberalism contains both, conservative atid radical elements. Its original inspiration is tlie metaphysical idea of Natural Law, and Divine Reason rooted in tlie classical tradition of philosophy represented by Ro~nanlawyerSt.Thon~asAquinas and Richard Hooker. Its modem version as elnphasised by Locke himself in, the fom of individual natural rights to life, liberty and property and resistance to arbitrary political, power became past of general political discourse and practice during the 18th Century and inspired, diinkers like Tom Paine, Jefferson and Rnusseau. On the more e~npiricaland pragmatic side it, influenced tlie English Utilitarians and also in some way thinkers like Hume and Adam Smith. Wjtli, the growth of positivist sciences and empiricist methodology the rationalistic aspect of Locke's, theory, belief in a transcendent deity and Natulzl Law, was relegated to the lirnbo of metapl~ysics,, but his views about natural rights, especially tlie right of property, were incorporated in the libertarian, liberalisln of tlie 19th and 20th centt~ries.Writers likc Rawls, Dworkin and Nozick, especially the, last one, bear clear imprint of Locke's thinking and profess affiliity to him. But ttlis affinity of, Locke to modern liberal thinkers is established only at the cost of ignoring the religious and, nzetapliysical aspect of his thougllt. Here it wo~lldbe pestinent to refer to tlie sober reflections of, Professol- Rayl~iondPolin :, We have tried to show, on the contrary, that freedom for bin1 is tiotliing but the, means given by God to human creatures capable of intelligence, reason and, society to incorporate themselves into the order of this world, when they grow, mature enough to discover and understand its meaning. Freedom as such is, always to bc understood as correlative with order. The liuman being, Locke, discovers, as a being capable of freedom and reason, is bound to tlie divine order, of the world through an obligation, the obligation to make himself actually free, and reasonable, either in the order of the relations he establishes with other men,, or in liis relations with tlie reasonable order of Ilie world. For Locke, freedom, exists and is meaningful only if it is bound to the obligation to achieve a reasonable, order and a nioral one. This principle lies at'the bottom of any true and efficient, liberalism. (Raymond Polin in JW Yolton, pp.17-18)., , SUMMARY, John Locke has been interpreted differently by different people. One controversy relates to the, alleged conflict between his empiricist theory of knowledge in liis 'An Essay Concerning, Human Understanding' and the rationalist view of Natural law in tlle Second Treatise of Civil, Governn~ent.It has been argued that the notion of nattlral law cannot be reconcilecl with the, overall empiricism of Locke which shows in his theory of origin of knowledge in experience, and reflection., The Nattlral Law constitutes an integral part of Locke's political theory. For him, it is prepolitical and not pre-social as men are social by nature. The state of nature is a state of peace,, good will, mutual assistance and self-preservation. It has the law of nature, which is God's, reason, to govcrn it. Anotlier important concept of Locke's is tlie natural right to life, liberty

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and property, derived fi-om natural law and limited by it. Man does not have unlimited right, of appropriation. They are limited by labour limitation, sufficiency limitation and spoilage, limitation., Since men are by nature, free, equal and independent, no one can be subjected to political, power of another without his own consent. Thus common colisent is required lo form civil, society after which a government or legislative has to be established to execute natural law., This authority or the legislative is the supreme authority. Besides this, there are two other, powers of t l ~ ecommot~wealth,the executive (includes judicial power) and the federative, (concerned with foreign affairs). The executive is answerable to the legislative. The legislative, cannot rule by arbitrary decrees but only through promulgated and established laws. On, sovereignty, Locke states that behind the authority of the legislature, there is an ultimate, sovereignty of the people which was later termed as popular sovereignty., Locke has been criticised for not explaini~lgthe concept of consent even though tile fundamental, principle of his theory is based on consent. He has also been described as an apologist of the, Glorious Revolution. Rebellion or resistance is an essential part of his philosophy but he does, not clearly state wllo has the right to rebel. And critics even say that he gave that right only, to the la~ldedaristoc~.acy,but this has been debated., , 7.9 EXERCISES, 1) Critically exa~ninethe limitations on the ownership of property as defined by Locke., 2) Write a short note on John Locke's ideas on Co~isent,Resistance and Toleratio~i., , 3) What were Locke's views on Sovereignty?